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Abstract—Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) is a popular model which maps roles to access permissions for resources and then
roles to the users to provide access control. Role-Based Encryption (RBE) is a cryptographic form of RBAC model that integrates
traditional RBAC with the cryptographic encryption method, where RBAC access policies are embedded in encrypted data itself so that
any user holding a qualified role can access the data by decrypting it. However, the existing RBE schemes have been focusing on the
single-organization cloud storage system, where the stored data can be accessed by users of the same organization. This paper
presents a novel RBE scheme with efficient user revocation for the multi-organization cloud storage system, where the data from
multiple independent organizations are stored and can be accessed by the authorized users from any other organization. Additionally,
an outsourced decryption mechanism is introduced which enables the users to delegate expensive cryptographic operations to the
cloud, thereby reducing the overhead on the end-users. Security and performance analyses of the proposed scheme demonstrate that
it is provably secure against Chosen Plaintext Attack and can be useful for practical applications due to its low computation overhead.
Index Terms—Role-based encryption, Role-based access control, Data outsourcing, Provably secure, User revocation.
F
1 INTRODUCTION
PUBLIC cloud storage have already become popular withend-users such as individuals and organizations. Some
popular public cloud storage includes Microsoft Azure Stor-
age Service [1], Amazon S3 [2], and Google Cloud Storage
[3]. The public cloud storage provides the data owners1 to
reduce their investment costs like building their own stor-
age infrastructures. It also enables ubiquitous data access
through the Internet without worrying about management
and maintenance of the outsourced data [4].
Although the benefits of public cloud storage are sig-
nificant, there is some reluctance among the data owners
to outsource their data in the storage servers of the public
cloud due to their concern for data security and privacy [5],
[6]. As the public cloud is formed by one or more cloud
storage servers which are often distributed geographically
in different locations, data owners do not know for certain
where their data are stored. There is a strong perception that
end-users lose control over their data once it is uploaded to
the cloud storage [7]. There is more reluctance, especially
if the data is sensitive. In [8], McAfee reported that 84%
of the outsourced data are sensitive or confidential such
as health-related data, financial documents, and personal
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1. Data owners are the end-users who own data.
photographs. This concern arises as the service provider
might have the ability to access the sensitive information
of the data owners for various motivations. For example,
if the outsourced data contain data owners’ health records,
the service provider has the potential to sell these data to
health insurance agencies for financial gain [9]. Hence, it is
critical to preserve the confidentiality of outsourced data so
that no malicious entity, including the service provider, has
the ability to access the data without proper authorization.
In order to control access of the data stored in a public
cloud, suitable access control policies and mechanisms are
required. The access policies must restrict data access to
anyone other than those intended by the data owners.
In large scale systems such as enterprise, Role-Based
Access Control (RBAC) has been widely used for access
control, as it provides flexible security management. For
instance, it allows access control to be managed at a level
that corresponds closely to the organisation’s policy and
structure. Roles in organizations are mapped to access per-
missions and users are mapped to appropriate roles. In
general, users are assigned membership to the roles based
on their responsibilities and qualification in the organisa-
tion, and permissions are assigned to qualified roles instead
of individual users. Moreover, in RBAC, a role can inherit
permissions from other roles, therefore there can be a hierar-
chical structure of roles. This is one of the major advantages
of the RBAC system. However, in the traditional RBAC
[10], [11], a service provider defines and enforces access
policies on behalf of the data owners. The data owners have
to, therefore, assume that the service provider is trusted
to prevent unauthorised users from accessing their data.
However, in an untrusted environment like a cloud envi-
ronment, the service provider may give access privileges to
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2unauthorized users for its own benefit, which can lead to
reduced level of trust on the part of the data owners on the
service provider when it comes to defining and enforcing
access policy. This, in turn, makes the traditional RBAC
mechanism less suitable for public cloud storage system.
Role-Based Encryption (RBE) is a cryptographic data
access control method which is designed by combining the
traditional RBAC model with the encryption method. It
enables data owners to define and enforce RBAC access
policy on the encrypted data itself [7], [12]. It thus reduces
dependency on the service provider for defining and en-
forcement of RBAC access policy while giving full control
to the data owners. In RBE, roles are organized to form
a hierarchy, and each role is associated with a group of
users who possess that role. Data are encrypted in such a
way that any user who holds the required roles can derive
the appropriate keys to decrypt the data. As the RBE is
based on the RBAC model, the inheritance properties of RBE
makes it more suitable for large organizations with complex
hierarchical structures.
There have been a few RBE schemes proposed over
the recent years such as [7], [12]–[14]. All of the schemes
are designed for a single-organization public cloud storage
system, where the outsourced data are hosted in the public
cloud by the data owners of an organization, and the data
are accessible to the users of the same organization only.
In such a case, a single authority maintains all the roles
and role hierarchies of that organization. The authority
is responsible for assigning roles and corresponding role-
keys to the users according to their access privileges in
the role hierarchy. Later, the users can access data using
their assigned roles, and role-keys will be used to decrypt
the appropriate encrypted data. As a result, a user must
hold a role in the organization to access data stored by that
organization.
In many practical scenarios such as consortium2, the
data owners from multiple organizations outsource their
data to the public cloud, and the data are shared with
the users of other organizations. It might also happen that
two organizations wish to work together on a collaborative
project requiring users from these two organizations to
share data in a secure manner. This is a more challenging
multi-organization public cloud storage scenario. In such
scenarios, the existing schemes [7], [13], [14] fail as an
authority in one organization will not be able to establish
roles for the users in the other organization(s) for the lack of
trust among the organizations. One approach to solving this
problem is to define a fresh RBE system for the consortium
creating separate roles and role hierarchies for the users of
the consortium from different organizations. However, this
creates a practical challenge as it is difficult to define the
authority who can manage this consortium role system, and
to which organization should this authority report to.
In this paper, we have developed a novel multi-
organization RBE scheme, which addresses the above chal-
lenge of sharing outsourced encrypted data between mul-
tiple organizations. Our multi-organization RBE scheme
will achieve the sharing of encrypted data across multiple
2. Consortium is an association where multiple organizations come
together to share data to achieve some common goals.
organizations in such a way that only users with appropriate
roles belonging to different organizations are able to decrypt
the data. Hence, the proposed scheme is suitable for secure
data sharing among several organizations such as in a
consortium or in collaborative projects, where the ability to
decrypt and access the data from different organizations is
only possible if the appropriate policies specified by those
organizations are satisfied. This has been achieved without
creating a fresh consortium RBE system as mentioned ear-
lier.
The realization of the proposed multi-organization RBE
scheme has been achieved using a hybrid cloud architecture
comprising a private cloud and public cloud3. The private
cloud is used to store only the sensitive information such as
user and organization related secrets, and the public cloud
is used to store the actual data in encrypted form. Users
who wish to share or access the data only interact with the
public cloud; there is no access for public users to access
the private cloud, which greatly reduces the attack surface
for the private cloud. This architecture not only dispels
the organisations concerns about risks of leaking sensitive
organization’s information, but also takes full advantage of
public clouds power to securely store large volume of data.
The noteworthy contributions of the scheme proposed in
this paper are as follows:
i) A single-organization role-based encryption scheme
referred to as SO-RBE is proposed. SO-RBE achieves
access control over encrypted data in a single-
organization cloud storage system, where the out-
sourced (encrypted) data are hosted by an organi-
zation. The encrypted data can be decrypted and
accessed by the users of same organization who
satisfy appropriate policies.
ii) A separate multi-organization role-based encryp-
tion scheme referred to as MO-RBE is proposed by
extending SO-RBE. MO-RBE enables a user of one
organization to access data from another without
possessing any role from that organization, provided
the user is authorized. That is, the existing roles of
the user from his/her own organization are alone
sufficient to access data of the other organizations
if the user is authorized (satisfies the appropriate
access policies needed to decrypt the data).
iii) An efficient user revocation mechanism is intro-
duced, which will work on both SO-RBE and MO-
RBE, for revoking users from the system without the
need to perform computationally expensive opera-
tions.
iv) An outsourced decryption method is also intro-
duced for outsourcing of the computation inten-
sive cryptographic operations to the cloud without
disclosing confidential information to the service
provider.
v) A formal security analysis of the proposed scheme
is provided which shows that the proposed scheme
is provably secure against Chosen Plaintext Attack
3. In a recent reference [8], McAfee reported that 59% of the organi-
zations are using the hybrid cloud model, and its popularity is growing
at an increasing rate among the organizations.
3(CPA) under the standard cryptographic assump-
tions.
vi) Moreover, performance analysis of the proposed
scheme demonstrates that the proposed scheme is
efficient to be used in practical applications.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first RBE scheme
that addresses access control over encrypted data for public
cloud storage system in a multi-organization context.
Unless stated otherwise, we refer the public cloud stor-
age system as the cloud in the rest of this paper.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Related
works are presented in Section 2. Section 3 gives a brief
overview of role hierarchy, properties of the bilinear map,
and complexity assumptions that will be used throughout
this paper. The system model, framework, security assump-
tions and security model are presented in Section 4. Section
5 describes the proposed scheme in detail. The security
and performance analysis details are given in Section 6 and
finally, Section 7 concludes this paper.
2 RELATED WORKS
2.1 Hierarchical Key Management (HKM) Schemes
Access control using hierarchical key management (HKM)
method has been studied in the early 1980s. In [15], Akl et
al. presented the first cryptographic hierarchical access con-
trol technique to solve the hierarchical multi-level security
problem. In this scheme, the users are grouped into disjoint
sets (or classes) and form a hierarchical structure of classes.
Each class is assigned with a unique encryption key and a
public parameter in such a way that a higher-level class can
derive encryption keys of any lower-level classes using its
encryption key and some public parameters. Later several
other HKM schemes have been proposed using different
techniques, e.g. [16]–[21]. Recently, in [19], Tang et al. pre-
sented a HKM scheme based on linear geometry to provide
flexible and fine-grained access control in cloud storage
systems. In this scheme, any class in the hierarchy can derive
encryption key using inner product of its public vector with
the private vector of its ancestor class. In [20], Chen et al.
proposed another HKM scheme to support the assignment
of dynamic reading and writing privileges. However, the
main drawback of the HKM schemes is the high complexity
for setting up the encryption keys for a large set of users
[7]. Also, user revocation is a challenging task, as all the
encryption keys that are known to the revoked users, and
their related public parameters need to change per user
revocation which may incur a high overhead on the system.
2.2 Hierarchical ID based Encryption Scheme (HIBE)
An alternative approach for the management of keys is
Hierarchical ID-based Encryption (HIBE) such as [22], [23].
In these schemes, a user can decrypt an encrypted data
using the private key associated with his/her identity if and
only if the data is encrypted using any descendant identity
of the hierarchy (i.e., tree). That is, the user cannot access
any data which are encrypted using the ancestor identities
or any other identity of the hierarchy. As such, the HIBE
schemes can enforce RBAC access policy in encrypted data
by associating the users with leaf nodes and roles with non-
leaf nodes in the hierarchy. However, in HIBE schemes, the
size of an identity increases with depth of the hierarchy.
In addition, the identity of a node must be a subset of its
ancestor node so that its ancestor node can derive this nodes
private key for decryption. Therefore, this node cannot be
assigned as a descendant node of another node in the
hierarchy tree unless the identity of the other role is also
the super set of this nodes identity.
2.3 Attribute based Encryption (ABE) Schemes
The first attribute-based encryption (ABE) scheme was pro-
posed in [24] based on the work in [25], and some other ABE
schemes have been proposed afterwards. In these schemes,
data is encrypted using a set of attributes, and users who
have the private keys associated with these attributes can
decrypt the data. These works have provided an alterna-
tive approach to secure the data stored in a distributed
environment using a different access control mechanism,
such as [26]. In [12], Zhou et al. have shown that an ABE
scheme can be used to enforce RBAC policies. However,
in that approach, the size of user key is not constant, and
the revocation of a user will result in a key update of all
the other users of the same role. [13] also investigated the
solutions of using ABE scheme in RBAC model. However
their solution only maps the attributes to the role level in
RBAC, and they assumed that the RBAC system itself would
determine the user membership. There have also been other
works based on variants of ABE such as [24], [27]–[31].
However, all these works [24], [27]–[31] cannot address role
hierarchy and inheritance properties.
2.4 Role based Encryption (RBE)
A role based encryption (RBE) scheme integrates the RBAC
access control model with cryptographic encryption tech-
niques to enforce RBAC access policies on encrypted data.
This enables the data to be encrypted to specific roles. Any
user who holds the required role(s) and satisfies the associ-
ated RBAC access policies can access the data by decrypting
it. It thus provides a secure solution for outsourcing data to
the cloud storage servers while giving access to authorized
users by defining and enforcing role based access policy on
the encrypted data itself.
In [12], Zhou et al. proposed the first RBE scheme for
data sharing in an untrusted hybrid cloud environment. In
this scheme, the ciphertexts and secret keys of the users are
of constant size. This scheme also offers efficient user revo-
cation capability. A complete design and implementation of
the proposed scheme with a real world application has been
described in [7]. In [13], Zhu et al. proposed another RBE
scheme that increases ciphertext size linearly with the num-
ber of roles. In the scheme [13], user revocation is performed
during encryption process by the data owner that embeds
revoke user information on the encrypted data itself. Hence
data owner must know all the revoked users’ information
prior to the data encryption phase. In [14], Perez et al.
proposed a data-centric access control mechanism for cloud
storage systems using the concept of proxy re-encryption
technique. In [14], the data owner outsources data before
encrypting it using the identity-based encryption technique
4proposed in [32]. To share data with the authorized users,
the data owner generates re-encryption keys based on the
RBAC access policies and keeps the re-encryption keys
with the ciphertexts. When an authorized user accesses the
ciphertext, the service provider re-encrypts the ciphertext
using the re-encryption keys based on a RBAC access policy.
However, none of these schemes [7], [12]–[14] support data
access control in multi-organization cloud storage systems.
In this paper, we have used the RBE scheme described
in [7], [12] as the basis for developing our RBE mechanism
for multi-organization cloud environment, which has sig-
nificant advantages compared to the ABE. It has the natural
ability to enforce RBAC policies on encrypted data stored
in the cloud with an efficient user revocation. A distinct
advantage is that RBE is able to deal with role hierarchies,
whereby roles inherit permissions from other roles. This
is particularly significant as role based systems has been
widely used in many large scale commercial systems pro-
viding flexible access control management corresponding
closely to the organisations policy and structure.
Similarly in a multi-authority context, a multi-
organization scheme based on ABE is not able to deal with
the hierarchical structure of the organization in an efficient
manner. On the other hand, a multi-organization scheme
based on RBE such as the one proposed in this paper
naturally fits with the organizational structure and is able
to capture effectively the role hierarchies and inheritance
properties. Furthermore, several of the multi-authority ABE
schemes such as [28], [29], [33] and [34] require a trusted
centralized/global authority to manage the set of attribute
authorities. In this sense, these schemes represent a single-
organization cloud environment. However, there are a few
multi-authority ABE schemes such as [35]–[37] can provide
role hierarchy and inheritance property. These schemes use
a hierarchical key generation method, where one top-level
domain authority can generate keys for the lower-level
domain authorities or users. But, [35]–[37] assume that same
root domain authority manages all the attributes of the
system [14]. As such, these schemes also represent a single-
organization cloud environment.
Fig. 1. Sample Role Hierarchy
3 PRELIMINARIES
This section introduces the concept of role hierarchy, prop-
erties of bilinear mapping as well as standard complexity
assumptions.
3.1 Role Hierarchy
In the proposed scheme roles are organized into a hierarchy
where ancestor roles can inherit access privileges of its
descendant roles. Figure 1 shows a sample role hierarchy.
The following notations are used to define a role hierarchy:
• Ψ: set of all roles in the role hierarchy. For example,
Ψ = {r1, r2, r3, r4, r5, r6, r7, r8}
• Ari : ancestor set of the role ri. For example,
Ar8 = {r1, r2, r4, r5, r6, r7, r8},Ar5 = {r1, r2, r5}
and Ar6 = {r1, r2, r4, r6}.
• Dri : descendant set of the role ri. For example, Dr5 =
{r8}, Dr1 = {r2, r3, r4, r5, r6, r7, r8}, Dr3 = ∅ and
Dr4 = {r6, r7, r8} .
• A¯ri : set of roles not in Ari , i.e., (Ψ \ Ari). For ex-
ample, A¯r8 = {r3}, A¯r5 = {r3, r4, r6, r7, r8} and
A¯r6 = {r3, r5, r7, r8}.
• D¯ri : set of roles not in Dri , i.e., (Ψ \ Dri). For exam-
ple, D¯r5 = {r1, r2, r3, r4, r5, r6, r7}, D¯r1 = {r1} and
D¯r4 = {r1, r2, r3, r4, r5}.
3.2 Bilinear Map
Let G1 and GT be two cyclic multiplicative groups. Let, g be
a generator of G1. The bilinear map eˆ : G1 × G1 → GT has
the following properties:
• Bilinear: eˆ(ga, gb) = eˆ(g, g)ab ∀g and ∀a, b ∈ Z∗q
• Non-degenerate: eˆ(g, g) 6= 1
• Computable: There exists an efficiently computable
algorithm for computing eˆ(g, g) for all g ∈ G1
3.3 Complexity Assumptions
1) Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) As-
sumption: Let eˆ : G1 × G1 → GT be an effi-
ciently computable bilinear map. The DBDH as-
sumption states that no probabilistic polynomial-
time algorithm is able to distinguish the tuples〈
ga, gb, gc, eˆ(g, g)abc
〉
and
〈
ga, gb, gc, eˆ(g, g)z
〉
with
non-negligible advantage, where a, b, c, z ∈ Z∗q and
g ∈ G1.
2) Decisional Modified Bilinear Diffie-Hellman
(MDBDH) Assumption [25]: Let eˆ : G1 ×
G1 → GT be an efficiently computable bilin-
ear map. The MDBDH assumption states that no
probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm is able to
distinguish the tuples
〈
ga, gb, gc, eˆ(g, g)
ab
c
〉
and〈
ga, gb, gc, eˆ(g, g)z
〉
with non-negligible advantage,
where a, b, c, z ∈ Z∗q and g ∈ G1.
4 PROPOSED MODEL
In this section, system model of the proposed scheme is
presented along with framework, security assumptions and
security model.
5Fig. 2. Proposed System Model
TABLE 1
NOTATIONS
Notation Description
q a large prime number
G1,GT two cyclic multiplicative groups of order q
H1(.) hash function H1 : {0, 1}w → Z∗q
Φ set of organization in the system
|Φ| total number of organizations in the system
Ψk set of roles managed by kth organization
SAk kth system administrator
RMrki
a role-manager of kth organization which manages role
rki
rki i
th role which is managed by kth organization
IDku unique identity of the uth user registered with kth
organization
RKki,u role-key of the role r
k
i issued to the user ID
k
u
4.1 System Model
Figure 2 shows the proposed system model. It consists
of six entities, namely system administrator, role-manager,
private cloud, public cloud, data owners, and users which
are described next. The notations used in this paper are
shown in Table 1.
• System Administrator (SA): It is a certified authority of
an organization. It is responsible for managing role
hierarchy of an organization. It generates system pa-
rameters including master secret and system public
parameter. It is responsible for issuing a pair of pri-
vate and public keys for each registered users. Sys-
tem administrator also issues role secret for each role
in the organization to the respective role-manager.
It also manages private cloud of an organization.
System administrator keeps a part of the master
secret and user secrets in the private cloud. Further, it
revokes users when required. Moreover, each system
administrator shares its long term secret with the other
system administrators in the cloud system so that its
users can access data from the other organizations.
• Private Clouds: It is formed by the internal cloud
storage servers of an organization which is managed
by the system administrator. The responsibility of the
private cloud is to keep confidential information of
the organization. Private cloud mainly stores a part
of the master secrets of the system administrator and
user secrets. It uses the known master secrets while
assisting the public cloud during outsourced decryp-
tion process, and it uses user secrets while assisting
the role-manager for generating role-keys in the key
generation process. Private cloud provides interfaces
to the public cloud and to the role-managers only.
• Role-Manager: It is an entity which is responsible for
managing roles. Each role-manager in an organiza-
tion manages each of its corresponding role(s) and
the associated users in that role(s). The role-manager
assigns roles to each registered users and issues role-
keys related with the assigned roles for them. During
the role-key generation process, the role-manager
interacts with the private cloud to compute role-keys
for the users.
• Public Cloud: It is formed by one or more cloud
storage servers which are managed by a third-party
service provider known as cloud service provider.
The main responsibility of the public cloud is to store
data owners’ outsourced (encrypted) data in its cloud
storage servers. The other responsibility is to perform
outsourced decryption.
• Data Owner: It is an entity who owns the data. A
data owner encrypts data using RBAC access policy
before outsourcing to the public cloud.
• User: It is an entity who uses the outsourced data.
Each user needs to register with a system administra-
tor. For each registered user, the role managers assign
roles in form of the role-keys based on their profiles
and responsibilities. The registered users also receive
6private keys from the system administrator.
4.2 Framework
The proposed scheme consists of the following phases and
algorithms.
1) System Initialization: This phase initializes the sys-
tem, and it is initiated by a system administrator. It
consists of the following algorithm.
• INIT ((gδk , PKSAk , MSKSAk) ← 1Λk): It takes
security parameter Λk as input. It outputs
master secret MSKSAk , public parameter PKSAk
and another secret gδk .
2) Manage Role: This phase is initiated by a system
administrator to generate secret role parameter, role
public keys and role secrets. It comprises the follow-
ing algorithm.
• ROLEPARAGEN ((RPSAk , {PKki }rki ∈Ψk ,
(RSrki)∀rki∈Ψk) ← (PKSAk ,H)): It takes system
public parameter PKSAk and a role key hierar-
chy H as input. It outputs secret role parame-
ter RPSAk and role public key PK
k
i , role secret
RSrki of each role r
k
i ∈ Ψk.
3) Key Generation: In this phase, system administrator
issues a pair of private, public keys, and user secrets
for each registered users. In this phase, the role-
manager also issues role-keys to each registered user
according to the roles they hold. It comprises the
following two algorithms.
• PRIVKEYGEN ((USIDku , u
k
u, PubIDku) ←
(IDku, MSKSAk , PKSAk)): It takes system public
parameter PKSAk , master secret MSKSAk and
unique identity IDku of a user as input. It
outputs private key uku, public key PubIDku and
user secret USIDku .
• ROLEKEYGEN (RKkm,u ←(
PKSAk , RSrkm , g
δk , USIDku , r
k
m
)
): It takes system
public parameter PKSAk , role secret RSrkm , g
δk ,
user secret USIDku and role r
k
m as input. It
outputs a role-key RKkm,u of the role r
k
m for the
user IDku.
4) Encryption: This phase is initiated by the data own-
ers to encrypt data using role public keys according
to RBAC access policy. It consists of ENC algorithm.
• ENC (CT ← (PKSAk , M,PKki )): It takes system
public parameter PKSAk , a message M ∈ M
whereM is the message space, and role pub-
lic key PKki of a role rki as input and outputs
a ciphertext CT.
5) Decryption: In this phase, a user of an organization
accesses encrypted data hosted by the same organi-
zation by decrypting it using his/her role-keys and
private key. It comprises DEC algorithm.
• DEC (M ← (CT, RKkx,u, uku)): It takes role-key
RKkx,u, private key u
k
u of a user ID
k
u and ci-
phertext CT as input and outputs a message
M if and only if rkx ∈ Arki .
6) User Revocation: In this phase, system administrator
revokes users from the system. It consists of URE-
VOKE algorithm.
• UREVOKE (⊥← PubIDku ): It takes public key
PubIDku of a revoked user ID
k
u as input. After
invalidating the public key PubIDku of the user
IDku, it outputs ⊥.
7) Role Public Key Update: In this phase, joint role
public key is generated when an organization wants
to share data with some other organizations. This
phase is initiated by the system administrator of
an organization. It consists of ROLEPUBKEYUPDATE
algorithm.
• ROLEPUBKEYUPDATE(
PK(k,k
′)
(i||j) ←
(
PKki ,PK
k′
j , PKSAk′
))
: It takes
role public key PKki of the role rki which is
maintained by the system administrator SAk
of the kth organization, another role public
key PKk
′
j of the role r
k′
j which is maintained
by the system administrator SAk′ of the k′th
organization and system public parameter
PKSAk′ as input. It outputs a joint role public
key PK(k,k
′)
(i||j) of the roles r
k
i and r
k′
j .
8) Multi-Organization Encryption: This phase encrypts
the data using the joint role public key according
to a RBAC access policy. It comprises MULTIENC
algorithm.
• MULTIENC (CT ← (PKSAk ,PK(k,k
′)
(i||j) , M)): It
takes public parameter PKSAk of SAk, joint role
public key PK(k,k
′)
(i||j) and the data (or message)
M as input. It outputs a ciphertext CT.
9) System Administrator Agreement: In this phase, an
organization (i.e., system administrator) shares a
secret key, termed as long term secret, with other
organizations. It consists of LONGKEYSHARE algo-
rithm.
• LONGKEYSHARE
((ReKeyk,k′ , g
(yk′−δk′ )σk′ ) ←
(MSKSAk′ , PKSAk′ , MSKSAk)): It takes master
secret MSKSAk′ of the k
th organization, public
parameter PKSAk′ and another master secret
MSKSAk of the k
′th organization as input. It
outputs a long term secret key g(yk′−δk′ )σk′ and
a proxy re-encryption key ReKeyk,k′ .
10) Multi-Organization Decryption: In this phase, a user
of an organization accesses the encrypted data from
other organizations by decrypting it using his/her
role-key and private key. It consists of MULTIDEC
algorithm.
• MULTIDEC (M ←
(CT, ReKeyk,k′ , ηk, σk′ , RKk
′
x,u, u
k′
u )): It takes
a ciphertext CT, proxy re-encryption key
ReKeyk,k′ , secrets ηk and σk′ , role-key RKk
′
x,u
and private key uk′,u as input. It outputs
plaintext data M if and only if rk
′
x ∈ Ark′j .
7Fig. 3. Sample Role Key Hierarchy
4.3 Security Assumptions
In the proposed scheme, the following security assumptions
are made.
i) Each system administrator and role-manager are
fully trusted entities.
ii) Public and private clouds are honest-but-curious
entities. They honestly perform assigned tasks, but
they may try to gain all the possible knowledge
about the outsourced data.
iii) Users are not honest. They may try to gain unau-
thorized access to the outsourced data by colluding
with other users.
iv) As the public cloud is honest, we do not consider
any active attacks from it by colluding with the
revoked users as in [38]–[40], etc.
v) All entities use secure channels while communicat-
ing with one another. The secure channels can be
established using Secure Sockets Layer (SSL).
vi) There is an authentication mechanism which is used
by role-managers and the public cloud to authenti-
cate the users.
4.4 Security Model
The security model of the proposed scheme is defined on
Chosen Plaintext Attack (CPA) security under selective ID
Model4 [25]. The CPA security can be illustrated using the
following security game between a challenger C and an
adversary A.
• INITIALIZATION Adversary A sends arbitrary role
hierarchies for each uncorrupted system authorities.
It also sends two challenged roles rki and r
k′
i of any
4. In the Selective-ID security model, the adversary must submit a
challenged role and role hierarchy before the start of the security game.
This is essential in our security proof to set up the role public key
(please refer Section 6.1 for more details).
two uncorrupted participating organizations/system
authorities5 to the challenger C.
• SETUP Challenger C runs INIT to generate system
public parameters PKSAk for each uncorrupted system
authority SAk. It also generates role public key PKki
for the role rki of all the uncorrupted system authori-
ties. It also generate re-encryption keys for each pair
of uncorrupted system authorities. The challenger C
sends the public parameters, i.e., PKSAk , role public
key PKki and the re-encryption keys to adversary A.
• PHASE 1 Adversary A submits two roles rkm and rk
′
m
so that rkm /∈ Arki (i.e., rkm ∈ A¯rki ) and rk
′
m /∈ Ark′j
(i.e., rk
′
m ∈ A¯rk′j ). It also sends an identity ID
k
u to
the challenger C. Here the challenged identity can
be associated with any of the uncorrupted system
authorities. The challenger C initiates PRIVKEYGEN
and ROLEKEYGEN algorithms to generate private
key, public key and role key and sends them to the
adversary A. The adversary A sends queries for the
secret keys to the challenger C by polynomially many
times.
• CHALLENGE When the adversary A decides that
PHASE 1 is completed, he/she submits two equal
length messages K0 and K1. The challenger C flips
a random coin b ∈ {0, 1} and encrypts the message
Kb by initiating MULTIENC algorithm.
• PHASE 2 Same as PHASE 1.
• GUESS Adversary A outputs a guess b′ of b. The
advantage of the adversary A to win this game is
AdvA = |Pr[b′ = b]− 12 |.
Definition 4.1. The proposed scheme is secure against cho-
sen plaintext attack if AdvA is negligible for any polynomial
time adversary A.
Remark 1. Note that, the challenger sends re-encryption keys
to the adversary A in the SETUP phase. As such, the adversary
5. Note that, the adversary can send more than two roles associated
with any organization to the challenger. For simplicity, we consider two
roles associated with two different organizations.
8A can re-encrypt the ciphertexts by itself. In addition, we do not
consider the ENC oracle, as the adversary A can get the same
response for the queries from the MULTIENC oracle.
5 PROPOSED SCHEME
In this section, an overview of the proposed scheme is pre-
sented followed by its main constructions. In the construc-
tion, the Single-Organization Role-Based Encryption (SO-
RBE) mechanism is presented first, followed by the Multi-
Organization Role-Based Encryption (MO-RBE) mechanism.
5.1 Overview
Although the existing RBE schemes [7], [13] provide access
control over encrypted data by enforcing RBAC access pol-
icy, these schemes cannot be applied in multi-organization
cloud storage systems. Our main challenge is to construct
a RBE scheme for both single and multi-organization cloud
storage systems that support efficient decryption and user
revocation.
In the proposed model, the system administrator of an
organization maintains a Role Key Hierarchy (RKH) associ-
ated with a role hierarchy. In a RKH, each role is associated
with a role public key and a group of users who hold
that role. For each user in the group, a role-manager, who
maintains that group, issues a unique role-key. The role-key
is computed in such a way that it can decrypt any encrypted
data computed using role public keys of any descendant
roles. That is, if a user holds a role-key associated with
the role rj , the user can decrypt any ciphertext computed
using role public key associated with the role ri if and
only if rj belongs to the ancestor set of ri (i.e., rj ∈ Ari ).
For better illustration, Figure 3 shows a sample RKH of
seven roles. Suppose, a data owner encrypts a message M1
using the role public key PKk7 then any user holding roles
r1, r2, r3, r4, r5, r6, r7 can decrypt it using their role-keys, as
Ark7 = {r1, r2, r3, r4, r5, r6, r7}. Similarly, if the data owner
encrypts another message M2 using role public key PKk6 then
the ciphertext can be decrypted only by the users who hold
roles r1, r3 and r6, as Ark6 = {r1, r3, r6}.
In order to share data with the users of other organiza-
tions, a joint role public key is computed by combining the
role public keys of the participated organizations. The joint
role public key is then used to encrypt data. The encrypted
data is further re-encrypted in such a way that any user
who holds a qualified role of a participated organization can
decrypt. That is, the role held by the user should belong to
an ancestor set of a role associated with the joint role public
key. This implies that the same piece of information can
be shared with the authorized users irrespective of which
organization they belong to.
The outsourced decryption is achieved by enabling the
public cloud to perform computationally expensive opera-
tions during decryption process. To achieve this, the users
delegate their role-keys to the public cloud in such a way
that the public cloud partially decrypts requested cipher-
texts using the delegated role-keys without knowing the
actual content of ciphertexts.
5.2 Single-Organization RBE (SO-RBE)
In this subsection, the proposed SO-RBE mechanism is
presented. It consists of the following six phases.
5.2.1 System Initialization
In this phase, a system administrator, say SAk, generates
system public parameter PKSAk and master secret MSKSAk . The
system public parameter PKSAk is kept in a public bulletin
board while the master secret MSKSAk is kept secret. It consists
of INIT algorithm which is explained next.
• INIT ((gδk , PKSAk , MSKSAk) ← 1Λk): SAk chooses two
multiplicative cyclic groups G1,GT of a large prime
order q, a generator g ∈ G1, a collision resistant
hash function H1 : {0, 1}w → Z∗q and a bilinear
map eˆ : G1 × G1 → GT . It also chooses ran-
dom numbers yk, δk, σk, ηk ∈ Z∗q . It then computes
Yk = eˆ(g, g)
yk , Vk = eˆ(g, g)
δk and hk = gηk . The
system public parameter is PKSAk , where PKSAk =
〈q,G1,GT , g, eˆ, H1, Yk, Vk, hk〉 and the master secret
is MSKSAk , where MSKSAk = 〈yk, δk, σk, ηk〉. SAk keeps
σk and ηk in its private cloud. SAk also sends gδk to
each role-manager of the organization.
5.2.2 Manage Role
In this phase, a system administrator, say SAk, generates se-
cret role parameter RPSAk . SAk also generates role public key
PKki and role secret RSrki for each role r
k
i in the organization.
SAk keeps the role public keys {PKki }rki ∈Ψk in its public
bulletin board and keeps secret role parameter RPSAk in a
secure place. It also sends role secrets to the respective role-
manager. This phase comprises ROLEPARAGEN algorithm
which is described next.
• ROLEPARAGEN ((RPSAk , {PKki }rki ∈Ψk , (RSrki)∀rki∈Ψk)←
(PKSAk ,H)): SAk chooses random numbers
[tk,i]rki ∈Ψk ∈ Z∗q . For each role rki in Ψk, it computes
role public keys PKki =
〈
PKki, {ARkl|rkl ∈ Arki }, rki
〉
and role secret RSrki , where
PKki =g
∑
rk
j
∈A¯
rk
i
tk,j
ARkl =g
tk,l
RSrki =
1∑
rkj ∈A¯rk
i
tk,j
The secret role parameter is RPSAk , where RPSAk =〈
[tk,i]rki ∈Ψk
〉
.
Remark 2. With this scheme, it is assumed that the root role
in the role hierarchy has more than two children roles to ensure
that the role secrets are not disclosed to any other role manager
(as with only two children roles each role-manager will know the
other’s secret role parameter).
5.2.3 Key Generation
In this phase, a system administrator issues a pair of pri-
vate, public keys and user secrets for each registered users.
The role-manager also issues role-keys to the registered
user. The issued private and role-keys are sent to the user
using secure-channels while the public key is kept in the
9public bulletin board. On the other hand, system admin-
istrator keeps the user secrets in its private cloud so that
the role-manager can access the stored user secrets from
the private cloud during role-key generation process. This
phase consists of two algorithms, namely PRIVKEYGEN and
ROLEKEYGEN which are given next.
• PRIVKEYGEN ((USIDku , u
k
u, PubIDku) ←
(IDku, MSKSAk , PKSAk)): Suppose a user, say ID
k
u, joins
the system for the first time. System administrator,
say SAk, chooses a random number uku ∈ Z∗q as a
private key and computes the public key PubIDku and
user secret USIDku , where
PubIDku =g
[uku+H1(IDku)]δk
ηk
USIDku =(g
yk)u
k
u = gyk·u
k
u
• ROLEKEYGEN
(
RKkm,u ←
(
PKSAk , RSrkm , g
δk , USIDku , r
k
m
))
:
When a role-manager RMrkm assigns a role to a user,
this algorithm is initiated. Let a user IDku holds a
role rkm. The role-manager RMrkm first authenticate the
user IDku and gets his/her user secret USIDku from the
private cloud. It then issues a role-key RKkm,u, where
RKkm,u =
(
USIDku · (gδk)H1(ID
k
u)
)RSrkm
=
(
gyk·u
k
u · (gδk)H1(IDku)
) 1∑
rk
j
∈A¯
rkm
tk,j
= g
[yk·uku+H1(IDku)·δk]∑
rk
j
∈A¯
rkm
tk,j
It is to be noted that gδk and RSrkm are known to the
role-manager RMrkm .
5.2.4 Encryption
In this phase, a data owner encrypts data before outsourcing
it to the public cloud. The data owner first encrypts a
random secret key using a RBAC access policy and then
encrypts the actual data using the secret key. For the secret
key encryption part, ENC algorithm is used, which is de-
fined next. While, for the actual data encryption part, any
secure symmetric key encryption algorithm, like Advanced
Encryption Standards (AES), can be used. Finally, the data
owner combines both the encrypted files and outsources it
to the public cloud.
• ENC (CT← (PKSAk , M,PKki )): Let a data owner wants
to encrypt message M ∈M, whereM is the message
space, using role rki . First, the message M is encrypted
using a random secret key, say K ∈ GT , and generates
a ciphertext EncK(M). Afterwards, the secret key K is
encrypted using the role public key PKki of the role
rki . The encryption procedure is explained below.
– data owner chooses a random number d ∈ Z∗q
and computes C1, C2, {C3l|∀rkl ∈ Arki } and
Ck,i, where
C1 =K
(
Yk
Vk
)d
=K · eˆ(g, g)
yk·d
eˆ(g, g)δk·d
=K · eˆ(g, g)yk·d−δk·d
C2 = (hk)
d
= gηk·d
C3l =(AR
k
l)
d = gd·tk,l
Ck,i =(PK
k
i)
d = g
d
∑
rk
j
∈A¯
rk
i
tk,j
– finally, the data owner generates a ciphertext
CT, where
CT =
〈
EncK(M), C1, C2, {C3l|∀rkl ∈ Arki }, Ck,i,
rki
〉
5.2.5 Decryption
In this phase, a user accesses encrypted data by decrypting
it using his/her private and role-keys. To take advantage
of the outsourced decryption, the user first sends a trans-
formed role-key to the public cloud, and the public cloud
partially decrypts the requested ciphertexts using the trans-
formed role-key and the public key of the user. Afterwards,
the user decrypts the partially decrypted ciphertexts using
his/her private key. This phase comprises DEC algorithm,
which is described next.
• DEC (M ← (CT, RKkx,u, uku)): Suppose a user IDku,
who holds a role rkx, wants to decrypt a ciphertext
CT =
〈
EncK(M), C1, C2, {C3l|∀rkl ∈ Arki }, Ck,i, rki
〉
,
where rkx ∈ Arki . The user IDku sends a data access
request to the public cloud along with a transformed
role-key TRKkx,u and r
k
x. The user ID
k
u chooses a
random number v ∈ Z∗q and computes TRKkx,u, where
TRKkx,u = (RK
k
x,u)
v = g
v[uku·yk+H1(IDku)·δk]∑
rk
j
∈A¯
rkx
tk,j
Afterwards, the user keeps the random number v in
a secure database for future use.
The public cloud initiates outsourced decryption pro-
cess once it received the transformed role-key TRKkx,u
from the user IDku. In the outsourced decryption pro-
cess, public cloud generates two ciphertext compo-
nents, namely P and Q. Let T = [uku · yk +H1(IDku) ·
δk] and Γ(rkx, r
k
i ) denotes
(
Drkx \ Drki
)
. Public cloud
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computes P and Q as follows:
P = eˆ
Ck,i ∏
rkl ∈Γ(rkx,rki )
C3l, TRK
k
x,u

= eˆ
gd∑rkj ∈A¯rki tk,j ∏
rkl ∈Γ(rkx,rki )
gd·tk,l , g
v·T∑
rk
l
∈A¯
rkx
tk,l

= eˆ
(
g
d
∑
rk
l
∈A¯
rkx
tk,l
, g
v·T∑
rk
l
∈A¯
rkx
tk,l
)
= eˆ(g, g)d·v·T = eˆ(g, g)d·v·[u
k
u·yk+H1(IDku)·δk]
Q = eˆ
(
C2, PubIDku
)
= eˆ
(
gηk·d, g
[uku+H1(ID
k
u)]δk
ηk
)
= eˆ(g, g)d[u
k
u+H1(ID
k
u)]δk
Later on, public cloud sends the newly computed
ciphertext components EncK(M), C1, P and Q to the
user. The user IDku gets K using his/her private key
uku and random secret v as follows:
K =
C1
X
, where
X =
(
P
1
v
Q
) 1
uku
=
 eˆ(g, g) d[uku·yk+H1(IDku)·δk]vv
eˆ(g, g)d[u
k
u+H1(ID
k
u)]δk

1
uku
=
(
eˆ(g, g)d[u
k
u·yk+H1(IDku)·δk]
eˆ(g, g)d[u
k
u+H1(ID
k
u)]δk
) 1
uku
=
(
eˆ(g.g)d·u
k
u·yk−d·uku·δk
) 1
uku = eˆ(g.g)d·yk−d·δk
Afterwards, the user IDku decrypts EncK(M) using K
and gets the actual message M. Finally, the user IDku
deletes the random secret v from his/her database.
5.2.6 User Revocation
System administrator revokes users in this phase. It consists
of UREVOKE algorithm which is described below.
• UREVOKE (⊥← PubIDku ): Suppose, SAk wants to re-
voke a user, say IDku. SAk simply removes the public
key PubIDku of the user ID
k
u from its public bulletin
board so that public cloud can no longer use it
for the outsourced decryption process. This, in turn,
prevents the revoked user from accessing data.
5.3 Extension to Multi-Organization RBE (MO-RBE)
The SO-RBE mechanism can only be used to achieve access
control over encrypted data in a single-organization cloud
storage system. In this subsection, our MO-RBE mechanism
is presented to achieve access control over encrypted data in
the multi-organization cloud storage system. The MO-RBE
is an extension of the SO-RBE mechanism which requires
the following additional phases.
5.3.1 Role Public Key Update
In this phase, the system administrator of an organization
computes joint role public key when it wants to share data
with the users of other organizations. This phase comprises
ROLEPUBKEYUPDATE algorithm which is described next.
• ROLEPUBKEYUPDATE (PK(k,k
′)
(i||j) ←
(PKki ,PK
k′
j , PKSAk′ )): Suppose k
th organization wants
to share data with the users of k
′th organization. Let
the system administrator SAk wants to share data
with its users who hold access privilege for the role
rki and also with the users of SAk′ holding access
privilege for the role rk
′
j . The system administrator
SAk computes a joint role public key PK
(k,k′)
(i||j) for the
roles rki and r
k′
j , where
PK(k,k
′)
(i||j) =
〈
PKki, PK
k′
j , {ARkl|rkl ∈ Arki }, {AR
k′
l |rk
′
l ∈ Ark′j },
rki , r
k′
j
〉
System administrator SAk knows PKk
′
j and
{ARk′l |rk
′
l ∈ Ark′j } from the role public key PK
k′
j
which is available in the public bulletin board of the
k
′th organization.
5.3.2 Multi-Organization Encryption
In this phase, a data owner of an organization encrypts data
using the joint role public keys so that the encrypted data
can be accessed by the authorized users of other organiza-
tions as well as his/her own organization by decrypting it.
This phase consists of MULTIENC algorithm.
• MULTIENC (CT ← (PKSAk ,PK(k,k
′)
(i||j) , M)): Let the data
owner wants to share a message M with the users of
his/her organization who hold access privilege for
the role rki and the users of another organization,
say k′ organization, who hold access privilege for
the role rk
′
j . Like the Encryption phase described in
Section 5.2.4, the data owner first encrypts data M
using a random secret key K ∈ GT and the secret
key K is encrypted using the joint role public key
PK(k,k
′)
(i||j) of the roles r
k
i and r
k′
j . Finally, the data
owner outsources both the encrypted data to the
cloud storage servers. This encryption procedure is
done as follows:
– the data owner chooses a random number d ∈
Z∗q and computes C1, C2, C ′2, where
C1 =K(
Yk
Vk
)d = K · eˆ(g, g)
yk·d
eˆ(g, g)δk·d
= K · eˆ(g, g)yk·d−δk·d
C2 =(hk)
d = gηk·d
C ′2 =(hk′)
d = gηk′ ·d
– afterwards the data owner computes
Ck,i, {C3l|∀rkl ∈ Arki }, Ck′,j and
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{C ′3l|∀rk
′
l ∈ Ark′j }, where
Ck,i =(PK
k
i)
d = g
d
∑
rkz∈A¯rk
i
tk,z
C3l =(AR
k
l)
d = gd·tk,l
Ck′,j =(PK
k′
j )
d = g
d
∑
rk
′
z ∈A¯rk′
j
tk′,z
C ′3l =(AR
k′
l )
d = gd·tk′,l
– finally, the data owner generates a ciphertext
CT, where
CT =
〈
EncK(M), C1, C2, C
′
2, Ck,i, {C3l|∀rkl ∈ Arki },
Ck′,j , {C ′3l|∀rk
′
l ∈ Ark′j }, r
k
i , r
k′
j
〉
5.3.3 System Administrator Agreement
In this phase, system administrator of an organization share
a secret key, termed as long term secret, with system admin-
istrators of other organizations so that its users can access
data stored by the other organizations. This phase comprises
LONGKEYSHARE algorithm which is described next.
• LONGKEYSHARE ((ReKeyk,k′ , g(yk′−δk′ )σk′ ) ←
(MSKSAk′ , PKSAk′ , MSKSAk)): Let the k
′th organization
wants to enable its users to access data hosted
by kth organization. SAk′ computes the long term
secret g(yk′−δk′ )σ
′
k using its master secret MSKSAk′
and sends it to SAk. Afterwards, SAk computes a
proxy re-encryption key ReKeyk,k′ and keeps it in its
private cloud, where
ReKeyk,k′ =
g(yk′−δk′ )σk′
g(yk−δk)
= g(yk′−δk′ )σk′−(yk−δk)
It is to be noted that this phase needs to be performed only
once between two organizations when they agreed to share
data.
5.3.4 Decryption
In this phase, a user of an organization access encrypted
data stored by another organization. This phase consists of
MULTIDEC algorithm, which is defined as follows.
• MULTIDEC (M ← (CT, ReKeyk,k′ , ηk, σk′ , RKk′x,u, uk
′
u )):
Suppose a user IDk
′
u having role r
k′
x
wants to access encrypted data CT =〈
EncK(M), C1, C2, C
′
2, Ck,i, {C3l|∀rkl ∈ Arki }, Ck′,j ,
{C ′3l|∀rk
′
l ∈ Ark′j }, r
k
i , r
k′
j
〉
, where rk
′
x ∈ Ark′j . Similar
with the Decrypt phase in Section 5.2.5, the user IDk
′
u
sends a data access request to the public cloud along
with a transformed role key TRKk
′
x,u and r
k′
x , where
TRKk
′
x,u = (RK
k′
x,u)
v = g
v[uk
′
u ·yk′+H1(ID
k′
u )·δk′ ]∑
rk
′
z ∈A¯rk′x
t
k′,z
where v ∈ Z∗q is a random number which is kept for
future use.
After receiving the data access request, public cloud
forwards the transformed role key TRKk
′
x,u to the pri-
vate cloud of SAk′ , and it also sends the ciphertext
components C1 and C2 to the private cloud of SAk.
The private cloud of SAk′ computes a temporary
decryption key TDKk
′
x,u and
(
PubIDk′u
)σk′
using TRKk
′
x,u
and σk′ , and sends them to the public cloud, where
PubIDk′u
is the public key of the user IDk
′
u and
TDKk
′
x,u =(TRK
k′
x,u)
σk′ = g
v
[
uk
′
u ·yk′+H1(ID
k′
u )·δk′
]
σ
k′∑
rk
′
z ∈A¯rk′x
t
k′,z
It is to be noted that σk′ is known to the private cloud
of SAk′ . On the other hand, the private cloud of SAk
translates (i.e., re-encrypts) the ciphertext component
from C1 to C ′1 using the proxy re-encryption key
ReKeyk,k′ and C2 as follows:
C ′1 = C1 ·X
= K · eˆ(g, g)yk·d−δk·d ·X
= K · eˆ(g, g)(yk′−δk′ )σk′ ·d, where
X = eˆ
(
ReKeyk,k′ , (C2)
1
ηk
)
= eˆ
(
g(yk′−δk′ )σk′−(yk−δk),
(
gηk·d
) 1
ηk
)
= eˆ (g, g)
(yk′−δk′ )σk′ ·d−(yk−δk)d
= eˆ (g, g)
(yk′−δk′ )σk′ ·d−(yk·d−δk·d)
Afterwards, the private cloud SAk sends the trans-
lated ciphertext component C ′1 to the public cloud.
After receiving TDKk
′
x,u,
(
PubIDk′u
)σk′
and C ′1, the pub-
lic cloud partially decrypt the ciphertext CT′ =
{CT ∪ C ′1} using TDKk
′
x,u and
(
PubIDk′u
)σk′
. The pub-
lic cloud computes P and Q as follows: let T =
[uk
′
u · yk′ + H1(IDk
′
u ) · δk′ ] and Γ(rk
′
x , r
k′
j ) denotes(
Drk′x \ Drk′j
)
P = eˆ
Ck′,j · ∏
rk
′
l
∈Γ(rk′x ,rk
′
j
)
C
′
3l, TDK
k′
x,u

= eˆ
g
d
∑
rk
′
z ∈A¯rk′j
t
k′,z
·
∏
rk
′
l
∈Γ(rk′x ,rk
′
j
)
g
d·t
k′,l , g
v·T ·σ
k′∑
rk
′
l ∈A¯rk′x
t
k′,l

= eˆ
g
d
∑
rk
′
l ∈A¯rk′x
t
k′,l
, g
v·T ·σ
k′∑
rk
′
l ∈A¯rk′x
t
k′,l

= eˆ (g, g)
d·T ·σ
k′ ·v
= eˆ (g, g)
[
uk
′
u ·yk′+H1(ID
k′
u )·δk′
]
σ
k′ ·v , (replacing value of T )
Q = eˆ
(
C
′
2,
(
Pub
IDk
′
u
)σ
k′
)
= eˆ
gη′k·d, g [u
k′
u +H1(ID
k′
u )]δk′ ·σk′
η′k

= eˆ (g, g)
d
[
uk
′
u +H1(ID
k′
u )
]
δ
k′ ·σk′
The ciphertext components EncK(M) and C ′1 are now
sent to the user IDk
′
u along with P and Q. Finally,
user IDk
′
u gets K using his/her private key u
k′
u and
random secret v as follows:
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K =
C ′1
R
, where
R =
(
P
1/v
Q
)(1/uk′u )
=

(
eˆ(g, g)
d·
[
uk
′
u ·yk′+H1(IDk
′
u )·δk′
]
σk′ ·v
)1/v
eˆ(g, g)d[u
k′
u +H1(ID
k′
u )]δk′ ·σk′

1/uk
′
u
=
 eˆ(g, g)d·[uk′u ·yk′+H1(IDk′u )·δk′]σk′
eˆ(g, g)σk′ ·d[u
k′
u +H1(ID
k′
u )]δk′
1/uk
′
u
=
 eˆ (g, g)[σk′ ·d·uk′u ·yk′+σk′ ·d·H1(IDk′u )·δk′]
eˆ(g, g)[σk′ ·d·u
k′
u ·δk′+σk′ ·d·H1(IDk′u )·δk′ ]
1/uk
′
u
=
(
eˆ(g, g)(yk′−δk′ )σk′ ·d·u
k′
u
)1/uk′u
=eˆ (g, g)
(yk′−δk′ )σk′ ·d
Later on, the user IDk
′
u decrypts EncK(M) using K and
gets M. Finally, the user IDk
′
u removes random secret
v from its database.
Remark 3. In the Decryption phase (Section 5.3.4) of MO-
RBE, any user from the kth organization (i.e., SAk) holding a
qualified role can easily decrypt the ciphertext CT using the DEC
algorithm as described in Section 5.2.5.
6 ANALYSIS
In this section, security and performance analyses of the
proposed scheme are presented. The security analysis shows
that the proposed scheme is provably secure against Chosen
Plaintext Attack (CPA) under the MDBDH assumption;
while the performance analysis presents a comprehensive
comparison of the proposed scheme with the closely-related
works along with the implementation results.
6.1 Security Analysis
The CPA security of the proposed scheme can be defined by
the following theorem and its proof.
Theorem 4. If a probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) adversary
A can win the CPA security game (defined in Section 4.4) with
non-negligible advantage , then a PPT simulator B can be
constructed to break the MDBDH assumption with non-negligible
advantage 2 .
Proof. In this proof, we show that a simulator B can be
constructed which uses an adversaryA to gain advantage 2
against the proposed scheme.
The MDBDH challenger C chooses random numbers
a, b, c, z ∈ Z∗q and flips a random coin µ ∈ {0, 1}. It sets
Z = eˆ(g, g)
ab
c if µ = 0 and Z = eˆ(g, g)z otherwise. After-
wards, the challenger C sends A = ga, B = gb, C = gc, Z to
the simulator B and asks it to output µ. Now, the simulator
B acts as a challenger in the rest of the security game.
In the game the simulator B interacts with an adversary
A as follows:
INITIALIZATION Let SSA and S′SA be the set of all system
authorities and corrupted system authorities respectively,
where S′SA ⊂ SSA. Adversary A submits arbitrary role hi-
erarchies Hk for each k ∈ (SSA \ S′SA) to the simulator B. It
also sends two challenged roles rki and r
k′
j of any two uncor-
rupted participating organizations, i.e., (k, k′) ∈ (SSA \ S′SA).
SETUP Simulator B chooses random numbers
{{αk,i}∀rki ∈Ψk , %k, ϕk, ζk ∈ Z∗q} for each uncorrupted
system authorities, i.e., ∀k ∈ (SSA \ S′SA). It sets %′k = %k · c
and ζ ′k = ζk · c. The simulator B then computes Yk =
eˆ(A, g) = eˆ(g, g)a, Vk = eˆ(C, g)
%k = eˆ(g, g)%
′
k , C%k = g%
′
k
and a long term secret
(
A
C%k
)ϕk
= g(a−%
′
k)ϕk . It also
computes Trkj = C
αk,j = gc·αk,j for all rkj ∈ Ψk and
hk = C
ζk = gζ
′
k . Afterwards, simulator B generates the
role public key PKki =
〈
PKki, {ARkj}∀rkj ∈Ark
i
, rki
〉
for each
k ∈ (SSA \S′SA), i.e., for each uncorrupted system authorities,
where
PKki =
∏
rkj ∈A¯rk
i
Trkj = g
c
∑
rk
j
∈A¯
rk
i
αk,j
; ARkj = Tk,j = g
c·αk,j
Simulator B sends PKSAk =
〈q,G1,GT , eˆ, g,H1, Yk, Vk, hk〉 along with PKki , g%
′
k and ga
to the adversary A, where k ∈ (SSA \ S′SA). It also sends the
re-encryption key ReKeyk,k′ =
g(a−%
′
k)ϕk
g
(a−%′
k′ )
to the adversary A
for each pair of (k, k′) ∈ (SSA \ S′SA).
PHASE 1 Adversary A submits two roles rkm and rk
′
m so
that rkm /∈ Arki and rk
′
m /∈ Ark′j to the simulator B in a key
generation query, where rkm and r
k′
m are the roles from two
uncorrupted system authorities, i.e., (k, k′) ∈ (SSA \ S′SA).
Adversary A also sends an identity IDku to the simulator
B for any k ∈ (SSA \ S′SA). Simulator B chooses a random
number uk,u ∈ Z∗q (private key of the adversary). It then
computes USIDku = A
uk,u . Later on, simulator B computes
public key PubIDku and role-key RK
k
m,u as follows:
PubIDku = g
[uk,u+H1(IDk,u)]%k
ζk
= g
[uk,u+H1(IDk,u)]c·%k
c·ζk = g
[uk,u+H1(IDk,u)]%
′
k
ζ′
k
RKkm,u =
(
USIDku · C%k·H1(IDk,u)
) 1∑
rk
j
A¯
rkm
αk,j
=
(
Auk,u · C%k·H1(IDk,u)
) 1∑
rk
j
A¯
rkm
αk,j
= g
[a·uk,u+c·%k·H1(IDk,u)]∑
rk
j
A¯
rkm
αk,j
= g
[a·uk,u+%′k·H1(IDk,u)]∑
rk
j
A¯
rkm
αk,j
Finally, the simulator B sends PubIDku , RKkm,u and uk,u to
the adversary A.
CHALLENGE When the adversary A decides that PHASE
1 is over, he/she submits two equal length messages K0
and K1 to the simulator B. The simulator B selects b ∈
{0, 1} at random and generates a challenged ciphertext
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CTb =
〈
Cb, C2, {C3l|∀rkl ∈ Arki }, Ck,i, C ′2, {C ′3l|∀rk
′
l ∈
Ark′j }, Ck′,i, r
k
i , r
k′
j
〉
, where
Cb = Kb
Z
eˆ(B%k , g)
= Kb
eˆ(g, g)
ab
c
eˆ(g, g)b·%k
= Kb
eˆ(g, g)a·r
′
eˆ(g, g)%k·c·
b
c
(
let r′ =
b
c
)
= Kb
eˆ(g, g)a·r
′
eˆ(g, g)%
′
k·r′
C2 = B
ζk = gζk·c·
b
c = gζ
′
k·r′
C3l = B
αk,l = gc·αk,l·
b
c = gc·αk,l·r
′
C ′2 = B
ζk′ = gζk′ ·c·
b
c = gζ
′
k′ ·r′
C3l = B
αk,l = gc·αk,l·
b
c = gc·αk,l·r
′
C ′3l = B
αk′,l = gc·αk′,l·
b
c = gc·αk′,l·r
′
Ck,i = B
∑
rkz∈A¯rk
i
αk,z
= g
b
∑
rkz∈A¯rk
i
αk,z
= g
b
c ·c
∑
rkz∈A¯rk
i
αk,z
= g
r′·c∑
rkz∈A¯rk
i
αk,z
Ck′,j = B
∑
rk
′
z ∈A¯rk′
j
αk′,z
= g
b
∑
rk
′
z ∈A¯rk′
j
αk′,z
= g
b
c ·c
∑
rk
′
z ∈A¯rk′
j
αk′,z
= g
r′·c∑
rk
′
z ∈A¯rk′
j
αk′,z
Simulator B sends CTb to the adversary A.
- PHASE 2 Same as PHASE 1.
- GUESS The adversary A guesses a bit b′ and sends
to the simulator B. If b′ = b then the adversary A wins
CPA game; otherwise it fails. If b′ = b, simulator B answers
“MDBDH” in the game (i.e. outputs µ = 0); otherwise B
answers “random” (i.e. outputs µ = 1).
If Z = eˆ(g, g)z ; then Cb is completely random from
the view of the adversary A. So, the received ciphertext
CT is not compliant to the game (i.e. invalid ciphertext).
Therefore, the adversary A chooses b′ randomly. Hence,
probability of the adversary A for outputting b′ = b is 12 .
If Z = eˆ(g, g)
ab
c , then adversary A receives a valid
ciphertext. The adversary A wins the CPA game with non-
negligible advantage  (according to Theorem 4). So, the
TABLE 2
NOTATIONS
Notation Description
|G1|, |GT | size of an element in G1 and GT respectively
TexpG1 computation cost of one exponentiation opera-
tion on an element of G1
TexpGT computation cost of one exponentiation opera-
tion on an element of GT
Tp computation cost of one pairing operation
nc number of roles associated with a ciphertext
nt total number of roles in an organization
nr total number of ancestor roles
nu total number of users associated with a role
probability of outputting b′ = b for the adversary A is
1
2 + , where probability  is for guessing that the received
ciphertext is valid and probability 12 is for guessing whether
the valid ciphertext Cb is related to K0 or K1.
Therefore, the overall advantage AdvA of the simulator
B is 12 ( 12 + + 12 )− 12 = 2 .
6.2 Performance Analysis
The performance analysis of the proposed scheme is pre-
sented in two parts, namely comprehensive analysis and
implementation results. In the comprehensive analysis, a
comparison is made between the proposed scheme (i.e., SO-
RBE and MO-RBE mechanisms) and closely-related works
Zhou et al.’s scheme [7] and Zhu et al.’s scheme [13] in
terms of functionalities, storage and computation overhead.
For this purpose, the same security level for the computa-
tion of cryptographic algorithms is considered in all stud-
ied schemes. In the implementation results, the proposed
scheme is compared with notable works Zhou et al.’s scheme
[7] and Zhu et al.’s scheme [13] in terms of computation
time. The notations used in the following subsections of this
paper are shown in Table 2.
6.2.1 Comprehensive Analysis
Table 3 shows a comparison of the proposed scheme with
the closely-related works Zhou et al.’s scheme [7] and Zhu
et al.’s scheme [13] in terms of some essential functionali-
ties. From the table, it can be observed that the proposed
scheme provides access control for both single-organization
and multi-organization cloud storage systems; while the
other schemes provide access control only for the single-
organization cloud storage system. Unlike [13], the pro-
posed scheme (i.e., SO-RBE and MO-RBE) uses private
cloud to keep user and role secrets. Moreover, the private
cloud in the proposed MO-RBE mechanism is used for pro-
viding assistance to the public cloud during outsourced de-
cryption. Also, unlike [13], the proposed SO-RBE and MO-
RBE mechanisms support outsourced decryption property
which reduces computation overhead on the user’s side. In
[7] and [13], users are revoked by updating all the role public
keys and by re-encrypting all the ciphertexts related with
the revoked users respectively. This may increase overhead
on the system if frequent user revocations occur. In [13], the
data owners control user revocation by embedding revoked
user identities during encryption process. But, it requires
knowledge of the revoked users during the encryption
process which may not be feasible always. Moreover, it
increases computation overhead on the data owner side if
the frequent user revocation occurs. On the other hand, in
the proposed scheme, users are revoked from the system by
invalidating the public keys of the users. Thus, the proposed
scheme takes very less computation overhead to revoke
users compared with the other closely-related schemes.
Table 4 shows storage and computation overhead com-
parison of the proposed scheme (i.e., SO-RBE and MO-RBE
mechanisms) with Zhou et al.’s scheme [7] and Zhu et al.’s
scheme [13]. The comparison is shown in asymptotic upper
bound in the worst cases. The storage overhead comparison
is done in terms of group element size (i.e., |G1|, |GT | and
|Z∗q |); while the computation cost comparison is done in
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TABLE 3
Functionality Comparison
Organization Private cloud Provide outsourceddecryption? User revocation
Re-encryption after
revocation
Revocation controllerSingle Multi
[13] Yes No Not required No Yes Required Data owner
[7] Yes No Required Yes Yes Not required System Administrator
SO-RBE Yes No Required Yes Yes Not required System Administrator
MO-RBE Yes Yes Required Yes Yes Not required System Administrator
TABLE 4
Storage and Computation Costs Comparison
Storage overhead Computation overhead
Ciphertext size User key size Master secret size Encryption Decryption User revocation
[13] (2 +nc)|G1|+ |GT | 2|G1|+ |Z∗q | (nt+1)|Z∗q |+
|G1|
(2 + nc)TexpG1 +
TexpGT
2Tp TexpG1 + TexpGT
[7] 3|G1|+ |GT | |G1| 3|Z∗q | 3TexpG1 + TexpGT (nr + nu)TexpG1 +
2TexpGT + 5Tp
6TexpG1 +TexpGT +
2Tp
SO-RBE (1 +nc)|G1|+ |GT | |G1|+ |Z∗q | (4 + nt)|Z∗q | (1 + nc)TexpG1 +
TexpGT
TexpG1 + 2TexpGT +
2Tp
Negligible
MO-RBE (2 +nc)|G1|+ |GT | |G1|+ |Z∗q | (4 + nt)|Z∗q | (2 + nc)TexpG1 +
TexpGT
4TexpG1 + 2TexpGT +
3Tp
Negligible
terms of number of exponentiation and pairing operations
(i.e., TexpG1 , TexpGT and Tp). It is to be noted that the com-
putation cost of group element multiplications and hash
operations are negligible compared with the pairing and
exponentiation operations (the reason is explained in Sec-
tion 6.2.2). Therefore, the group element multiplications and
hash operations are ignored in the rest of the comparisons.
For the storage overhead comparison, ciphertext size, user
secret key size and master secret key size are considered;
while the encryption, decryption and user revocation costs
are considered for comparing computation overhead. The
encryption cost of the proposed scheme and [13] mainly
depend on the number of ancestor roles associated with a
ciphertext, as both the schemes need to compute one ex-
ponentiation operation per ancestor role during encryption
process. While, in [7], the encryption process needs constant
four exponentiation operations. It is to be noted that en-
cryption operation for a data is performed only once. In
[13], the decryption processing cost is constant which takes
only two pairing operations, and the pairing operations are
performed by the users. In [7], the decryption processing
cost mainly depends on the number of ancestor roles and
the number of users associated with a role. On the other
hand, in the proposed scheme, a user needs to perform only
three exponentiation operations in both SO-RBE and MO-
RBE mechanisms during decryption process, and the other
cryptographic operations are performed by the public and
private clouds. Hence, the decryption processing cost of the
proposed scheme is comparable with [13]; while it takes
considerably less cost compared with [7]. In [13], user re-
vocation operation requires two exponentiation operations
per ciphertext; while in [7], user revocation operation takes
five exponentiation operations and one pairing operation.
On the other hand, in the proposed scheme, the users are
revoked from the system by removing or invalidating their
public keys which takes considerably less computation cost.
TABLE 5
Computation Time (in Milliseconds) of Elementary Cryptographic
Operations
Exponentiation Pairing Group multiplica-tion Hash
G1 GT G1 GT
Commodity
Laptop 2.062 0.126 1.292 0.008 0.002 0.003
Workstation 1.153 0.091 0.645 0.005 0.001 0.002
Fig. 4. Encryption Time Comparison of SO-RBE, MO-RBE with Zhou et
al.’s scheme [7] and Zhu et al.’s scheme [13]
6.2.2 Implementation Results
The proposed scheme as well as two closely-related con-
structions Zhou et al.’s scheme [7] and Zhu et al.’s scheme
[13] are implemented using Pairing-Based Cryptography
(PBC) library [41]. The elementary cryptographic operations
that are performed by the data owners and users are im-
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Fig. 5. Decryption Time in Zhou et al.’s scheme [7]
plemented using a commodity Laptop Computer having
Ubuntu 17.10 (64-bit) operating system and having 2.4GHz
Core i3 processor with 4GB memory. The elementary crypto-
graphic operations that are performed by public and private
clouds are implemented using a workstation having Ubuntu
17.10 (64-bit) operating system and having 3.5 GHz Intel(R)
Xeon(R) CPU E5-2637 v4 processor with 16 GB memory.
For the implementation purpose, type A elliptic curve
with embedding degree 2 of 160-bit group order is used,
which provides an equivalent 1024-bit discrete log security.
The implementation results of the elementary mathematical
functions like exponentiation operations on G1,GT , pair-
ing operation, group element multiplication operations on
G1,GT , and hash operation are shown in Table 5. From the
Table 5, it is observed that the computation time of group
element multiplications on G1,GT and hash operation are
negligible compared with the cryptographic exponentiation
and pairing operations.
Figure 4 shows the encryption time of the proposed
scheme, i.e., SO-RBE and MO-RBE along with Zhou et al.’s
scheme [7] and Zhu et al.’s scheme [13]. From the figure, it is
observed that the encryption time of the proposed scheme
and [13] linearly increase with the number of roles associ-
ated with a ciphertext; while the encryption time in [7] takes
constant time, as in [7] the encryption process takes constant
four exponentiation operations. Figure 5 shows decryption
time in Zhou et al.’s scheme [7]. As the decryption time in [7]
increases with the number of ancestor roles associated with
a ciphertext and the number of users associated with a role,
the decryption time in [7] linearly increases with the number
of ancestor roles and number of users associated with a role.
On the other hand, the decryption time of the proposed
SO-RBE, MO-RBE mechanisms and [13] take constant time,
approximately 4.60 milliseconds (ms), 9.675 ms and 3.58 ms
respectively. Hence, it can be concluded that the decryption
time of the proposed scheme take considerably less than of
[7], while it is comparable with [13].
7 CONCLUSION
In this paper, a novel cryptographic role-based access con-
trol scheme has been proposed for both single and multi-
organization cloud storage systems. The proposed scheme
employs a Role-Based Encryption (RBE) method to enforce
RBAC access policies in encrypted data that enables only the
authorized users with qualified roles are able to decrypt. It
delegates costly cryptographic operations in the decryption
process to the cloud that reduces the overhead on the user
side. It also enables the system administrator to revoke
a user from the system by revoking/invalidating user’s
public key with minimal overhead. In addition, we have
demonstrated that the proposed scheme is provably secure
against CPA under the MDBDH cryptographic assumption.
Furthermore, we have shown that the performance of the
proposed scheme is better compared with the previous
schemes.
Dynamic change of roles in the role hierarchy poses
challenges in role-based access control systems. Design of
efficient cryptographic role-based access control scheme
supporting dynamic changes in roles will be one of the
areas of future work. Another area of interest involves the
development of trust models for a multi-organization cloud
environment. In this context, the model such as the one in
[42] can be used to extend our proposed scheme to enhance
the trust of the data owners on the multi organization
system authorities.
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